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(and Not Just Whistleblowers)
Evan J. Ballan*
When the government contracts with private parties, the risk of fraud runs
high. Fraud against the government hurts everyone: taxpayer money is wasted
on inferior or nonexistent products and services, and the public bears the bur-
dens attendant to those inadequate goods. To combat fraud, Congress has de-
veloped several statutory frameworks to encourage whistleblowers to come
forward and report wrongdoing in exchange for a monetary reward. The fed-
eral False Claims Act allows whistleblowers to file an action in federal court on
behalf of the United States, and to share in any recovery. Under the Dodd-
Frank Act, the SEC Office of the Whistleblower investigates tips provided by
whistleblowers and, in the event of a successful prosecution, pays an award to
the tipster. The False Claims Act and SEC program both protect
whistleblowers from retaliatory action from their employer. But the SEC pro-
gram goes a step further: SEC Rule 21F-17 also prevents an employer from
taking any action to interfere with the reporting of fraud. In this way, the SEC
program protects not only whistleblowers, but also whistleblowing itself. It’s
time for the False Claims Act to catch up. Congress should look to SEC Rule
21F-17 as a model for how it could amend the False Claims to establish a
cause of action against contractors who take steps to chill or restrict their em-
ployees from bringing forward claims of fraud. In doing so, it will vindicate
the original intent and purpose of the False Claims Act and encourage
whistleblowers to come forward and put an end to corporate wrongdoing. Pro-
tecting whistleblowing benefits the government, taxpayers, and
whistleblowers—and ensures that the False Claims Act remains an effective
instrument in the fight against fraud.
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Introduction
When the government contracts with private parties, the specter of
fraud always looms. The massive amounts of money at stake in government
contracts, combined with an often-overburdened infrastructure with limited
oversight, make federal contracting a field particularly ripe for abuse. As
government activity increases, so too does the use of third parties to provide
procurement and contracting services. But with increased reliance on third-
party contractors comes a heightened risk that those services are tainted by
fraud. Fraud against the government hurts everyone. Taxpayer money is
wasted on inferior or nonexistent products and services, and the public
bears the burdens attendant to those inadequate goods. The costs of fraud
include not only direct financial loss, but also potential endangerment of
public health and national security: major fraud prosecutions have involved
the sale of adulterated or misbranded drugs to Medicare and Medicaid pa-
tients,1 or the provision of defective supplies to the military.2
To combat such wrongdoing, the government has developed an arsenal
of legislative and administrative tools designed to detect fraud against the
government and punish those who perpetrate it. Perhaps the most potent of
these tools is the federal False Claims Act. The False Claims Act (“FCA”) has
been described as “the government’s most effective civil tool to ferret out
fraud and return billions to taxpayer-funded programs.”3 Congress imple-
mented the FCA during the Civil War in the face of widespread fraud
against the government. Its unique qui tam provisions allow an individual
whistleblower to initiate a claim against a wrongdoer on behalf of the gov-
ernment, and to share in a portion of any ultimate recovery. In this way, the
FCA provides a compelling incentive for those with knowledge of fraud to
1. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Abbott Labs to Pay $1.5 Billion to Resolve
Criminal & Civil Investigations of Off-Label Promotion of Depakote (May 7, 2012), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/abbott-labs-pay-15-billion-resolve-criminal-civil-investigations-label-
promotion-depakote [https://perma.cc/UR6S-2ZXW].
2. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ATK Launch Systems Inc. Settles False
Claims Product Substitution Case for Nearly $37 Million (Apr. 23, 2012), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/atk-launch-systems-inc-settles-false-claims-product-substitution-case-
nearly-37-million [https://perma.cc/8SUQ-D63G].
3. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers over $3.5 Billion
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2015 (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/justice-department-recovers-over-35-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2015 [https://
perma.cc/QVT6-GBZW] (quoting Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Benjamin C.
Mizer).
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come forward. Today, the FCA remains an active and effective enforcement
mechanism: in 2015 alone, FCA litigation resulted in over $3.5 billion in
recovery to the United States.4
Like other whistleblowing statutes and programs, the FCA contains an-
tiretaliation provisions that aim to protect would-be whistleblowers by
prohibiting employers from taking retaliatory action against an employee for
engaging in whistleblowing activity. This makes sense—such provisions in-
crease the likelihood that insiders will report wrongdoing, thus protecting
the government and taxpayers at large from fraud and abuse. They also pro-
tect employees from suffering personal harm for serving the public interest
in combating fraud.
By contrast, the SEC whistleblower program—which Congress devel-
oped in response to the 2008 financial crisis—includes antiretaliation pro-
tections similar to those in the FCA that protect whistleblowers from
professional or personal backlash. But the SEC has also established a rule
that prohibits employers from taking any action that interferes with
whistleblowing activity. The SEC has used this rule to target a wide range of
activity, including confidentiality agreements, employment agreements, and
severance agreements, that might chill whistleblowers from pursuing legiti-
mate claims. In other words, unlike the FCA, the SEC rules protect not only
whistleblowers, but also whistleblowing itself.
It’s time for the FCA to catch up. Congress should amend the FCA to
enact similar prohibitions against antiwhistleblowing activity so that the Act
continues to serve as a robust tool to deter and combat government fraud.
By doing so, Congress could ensure that, like the SEC program, the FCA best
serves its public interest aims by protecting whistleblowing, and not just
whistleblowers.
Part I of this Note provides a history and overview of the FCA and the
SEC Office of the Whistleblower. It also examines one of the SEC program’s
rules, Rule 21F-17, which targets antiwhistleblowing activity. Part II focuses
on the antiretaliation provisions of the FCA. It shows that the FCA provi-
sions are less robust than the SEC rules because of the FCA’s narrower focus
on protecting whistleblowers. Part III argues that judges and lawmakers
should recognize the important—but distinct—functions that
whistleblower-protection and whistleblowing-protection laws accomplish,
and implement this framework in their decisionmaking and legislating
processes. To begin that reform, Congress should look to SEC Rule 21F-17 as
a model and implement a similar cause of action within the FCA. Focusing
on protecting both whistleblowers and whistleblowing promotes the under-
lying purpose and intent of the law and bolsters the ability of the govern-
ment to root out and combat fraud.
4. Id.
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I. Fighting Fraud: A Tale of Two Whistleblower Programs
This Note focuses on two major bodies of modern whistleblower law in
the United States: actions under the FCA, which are litigated in federal
courts, and the administrative SEC whistleblower program, which was estab-
lished by the Dodd-Frank Act. Both are tools Congress created to use infor-
mation provided by whistleblowers to identify and prosecute fraud. Indeed,
the SEC whistleblower program was based on the fraud-combatting success
of the FCA and borrows much of its design. But the programs operate in
fundamentally different ways and offer different protections. This Part pro-
vides an overview of the history and functioning of each program and an
overview of one of the rules governing the SEC whistleblower program: Rule
21F-17.
A. The False Claims Act
The roots of the FCA stretch back to the early days of the American
Civil War.5 Amid the massive wartime effort, the United States saw a sub-
stantial increase in government spending, accompanied by a shift in respon-
sibilities from the local to federal level for contracting with third parties for
war-related supplies.6 In the consolidated procurement effort, “the various
Northern states . . . [gave] up independent procurement authority to the
U.S. bureaus,” which in turn entered into “thousands of agreements with
hundreds of prime contractors all over the country.”7 Centralizing this con-
tracting activity offered a number of economic efficiencies, but it also gave
rise to a new problem: rampant fraud in the procurement process. As the
use of outside contractors became “routine and essential to the Union’s war
effort,”8 purchasing contracts for Union army supplies were plagued by
“unimaginable levels of fraud.”9 Soldiers were hindered by a slew of defec-
tive and substandard clothing and equipment, including shoes, uniforms,
coats, blankets, guns, ammunition, and even horses.10
5. See United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 (1976) (“The Act was originally
aimed principally at stopping the massive frauds perpetrated by large contractors during the
Civil War.”).
6. William Sims Curry, Ethics in Contracting, in Government Contracting: A Public
Solutions Handbook 148, 148–51 (Robert A. Shick ed., 2016) (describing some of the “nefa-
rious contracting practices discovered during the civil war”); see also Mark R. Wilson, The
Business of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861–1865, at 108 (2006).
7. Wilson, supra note 6, at 107–08 (describing contracting as “routine and essential to
the Union’s war effort”).
8. Id. at 107.
9. Mark Greenbaum, The Civil War’s War on Fraud, N.Y. Times: Opinionator (Mar. 7,
2013, 12:22 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/the-civil-wars-war-on-
fraud/ [http://perma.cc/S5G3-TKPP].
10. Id.; see also How a Law from the Civil War Fights Modern-Day Fraud, NPR: Planet
Money (Oct. 1, 2014, 4:21 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?story
Id=352819369 (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“Soldiers complained about shoddy
uniforms that would dissolve in rain, gunpowder in cannons and in guns wouldn’t fire and a
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Congress enacted the legislation that would become the FCA on March
2, 1863.11 The statute—titled “An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon
the Government of the United States”—prohibited the making or present-
ment of “false, fictitious, or fraudulent” claims against the government and
its officers.12 It enumerated a range of fraudulent conduct, including making
false vouchers, oaths, or signatures; forging papers; conspiring to defraud;
stealing or embezzling; delivering false receipts; and concealing property.13 A
person found guilty of violating the statute was subject to a term of impris-
onment between one and five years and liable to the government for the
amount of $2,000 plus double the amount of actual damages sustained.14
Finally, and most importantly, the statute allowed a suit to be “brought
and carried on by any person, as well for himself as for the United States.”15
An individual who brought suit under the statute would be entitled to one-
half of the amount recovered, plus the costs of bringing the suit, and the
government would receive the other half of the award.16 The statute allowed
whistleblowers to bring suit on behalf of the United States, and to receive a
bounty in the event of a successful claim. This sort of law is known as a qui
tam statute and was designed to incentivize individual whistleblowers (also
known as “informers” or “relators”) to privately prosecute public wrongs.17
Michigan Senator Jacob Howard, who introduced the bill on the floor,
characterized the fraud epidemic in stark terms. He described contracting
fraud as a “great evil”18 and “one of the crying evils of the period” and
announced that “our Treasury is plundered from day to day by bands of
conspirators, who are knotted together . . . for the purpose of defrauding
and plundering the Government.”19 Senator Howard also discussed the deci-
sion to use the qui tam mechanism, stating that its effect was to “hold out to
a confederate a strong temptation to betray his coconspirator” based upon
the “old-fashioned idea of . . . ‘setting a rogue to catch a rogue,’ which is the
lot of it was mixed with sawdust. They would get horses that were withered, that were weak,
and even in some cases, blind.”).
11. An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the United States, ch.
67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863).
12. Id. § 1.
13. Id.
14. Id. § 3.
15. Id. § 4.
16. Id. § 6.
17. See generally Nicholas R. Parrillo, Against the Profit Motive: The Salary
Revolution in American Government, 1780–1940, at 28–31 (2013); J. Randy Beck, The
False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 539
(2000); Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 Wash. U. L.Q. 81. Qui tam
statutes enjoyed widespread use in England in the Middle Ages and early modern period, but
had generally fallen into disfavor in the United States. See Note, supra, at 83–101.
18. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952 (1863) (statement of Sen. Howard).
19. Id. at 955.
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safest and most expeditious way I have ever discovered of bringing rogues to
justice.”20
Senator Howard did not see whistleblowers as individuals who per-
formed a brave and noble act at the risk of personal consequence. Rather, to
Howard, informants were “rogue[s]” and “coconspirator[s]” whose alle-
giances could be bought by the government if the price was right.21 It is no
surprise, then, that this early version of the statute did not contain any pro-
visions involving retaliation against whistleblowers or protecting their inter-
ests in any way. It was not until much later that Congress would recognize
the importance of protecting those who came forward to expose
wrongdoing.
The twentieth century saw significant transformation of the FCA. In-
creased federal spending in the wake of the New Deal and during World War
II resulted in new opportunities for fraud, and the courts saw a correspond-
ing surge in qui tam litigation, accompanied by new controversy.22 Concerns
arose over a growing number of so-called “parasitic” actions: after the gov-
ernment would indict a contractor for fraud, someone would file an FCA
lawsuit alleging the exact same conduct that formed the basis of the indict-
ment, in the hopes of receiving a bounty for frauds already known.23 These
actions did little to promote the reputation of whistleblowers and their law-
yers, who began to look less like champions of the public, and more like
opportunists hoping to get rich quick.
In 1943, then–Attorney General Francis Biddle first urged Congress to
repeal the FCA in its entirety.24 He feared that whistleblower litigation was
no longer serving a legitimate purpose, but instead was a tool for abuse by
plaintiffs and their attorneys.25 Biddle complained that many lawsuits under
the statute had become “mere parasitical actions, occasionally brought only
after law-enforcement officers have investigated and prosecuted persons
guilty of a violation of law and solely because of the hope of a large re-
ward.”26 Congress declined to repeal the FCA and instead enacted a series of
20. Id. at 955–56.
21. Senator Howard did note that informants were “not confined” to the class of cocon-
spirators and could even include the district attorney. Id. at 955.
22. United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Emps.’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 679–80 (D.C.
Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 579 U.S. 457
(2007).
23. See Beverly Cohen, KABOOM! The Explosion of Qui Tam False Claims Under the
Health Reform Law, 116 Penn St. L. Rev. 77, 82–83 (2011); Ryan G. Hassanein, Revamping the
False Claims Act, Law360 (Aug. 5, 2009, 1:00 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/110289/
revamping-the-false-claims-act [http://perma.cc/FH4C-QQWT].
24. S. Rep. No. 77-1708, at 2 (1942).
25. See id.; H.R. Rep. No. 78-263, at 1–2 (1943). For a particularly egregious example of
a parasitic action and a discussion by the Court of the problem, see United States ex rel. Marcus
v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
26. S. Rep. No. 77-1708, at 2; H.R. Rep. No. 78-263, at 1–2; see also Charles Doyle,
Cong. Research Serv., R40785, Qui Tam: The False Claims Act and Related Federal
Statutes 6–7 (2009), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40785.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q6P-SAER];
Robert Salcido, Screening Out Unworthy Whistleblower Actions: An Historical Analysis of the
December 2017] Protecting Whistleblowing (and Not Just Whistleblowers) 481
amendments designed to address Biddle’s concerns.27 Following the 1943
amendment and the end of World War II, FCA litigation decreased
significantly.28
Congress amended the FCA again in 1986, amid a resurgence of public
outcry about fraud against the government. Rumors of contracting run
amok and extravagant expenditures—including one report that the Depart-
ment of Defense spent $640 on a toilet seat—generated widespread criticism
of the way that the government was spending taxpayer money and prompted
new calls for reform.29 In response, Congress expanded and bolstered the
FCA, “usher[ing] in the golden age of the whistleblower.”30 Among other
changes,31 the FCA, for the first time, included provisions protecting
whistleblowers from retaliation and created a private right of action for re-
taliation claims. Specifically, the FCA provided protection for employees
who were “discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any
other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employ-
ment . . . for lawful acts done . . . in furtherance of an action under this
section.”32 An employee who experienced the retaliation prohibited by the
provision could bring a retaliation action against her employer for “all relief
necessary to make the employee whole,” including, where appropriate, rein-
statement, back pay, and special damages.33
The FCA has seen widespread use following the 1986 amendments34—
an unsurprising outcome in light of the broad expansions that the amend-
ments implemented, coupled with the government’s increasing reliance on
Public Disclosure Jurisdictional Bar to Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act, 24 Pub.
Cont. L.J. 237 (1995).
27. These included a requirement that an informant provide the government with a dis-
closure statement of “substantially all” material evidence supporting her claim at the time of
filing suit; the introduction of the so-called “public disclosure bar,” which precludes an action
that is primarily based on information that is already in the public domain; and a reduction in
the amount of the reward that a relator could receive. 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1946); see also
Doyle, supra note 26, at 7.
28. See Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559
U.S. 280, 294 (2010).
29. See William D. Hartung, Only the Pentagon Could Spend $640 on a Toilet Seat, Na-
tion (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/only-the-pentagon-could-spend-640-
on-a-toilet-seat/ [https://perma.cc/44HB-ELVM]; Jack Smith, $37 Screws, a $7,622 Coffee
Maker, $640 Toilet Seats; : Suppliers to Our Military Just Won’t Be Oversold, L.A. Times, (July
30, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-07-30/news/vw-18804_1_nut [https://perma.cc/
9J24-WUBP]; Dept. of Hundred-Dollar Toilet Seats, N.Y. Times (Feb. 18, 1986), http://
www.nytimes.com/1986/02/18/us/dept-of-hundred-dollar-toilet-seats.html (on file with the
Michigan Law Review).
30. How a Law from the Civil War Fights Modern-Day Fraud, supra note 10.
31. See generally False Claims Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153
(1986); S. Rep. No. 99-345 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266; H.R. Rep. No. 99-660
(1986).
32. § 4, 100 Stat. at 3158.
33. Id.
34. The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, passed by Congress in 2009, again
amended the Act to clarify and reinforce parts of the 1986 amendments, but the retaliation
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contracting and outsourcing.35 The United States relies more than ever on
widespread privatization of public services, such as health care, prisons, edu-
cation, and even ambulance services.36 In recent years, FCA litigation has
resulted in blockbuster verdicts and settlements in the health-care,37 de-
fense,38 and banking39 industries, among others.
By all accounts, the FCA is alive and well today. In 2014, the Depart-
ment of Justice announced that it had obtained a record $5.69 billion in
settlements and judgments from over 700 whistleblower cases.40 Senator
Chuck Grassley, an outspoken advocate of the FCA, has called it “hands
down, the most effective tool the government has to fight fraud against the
taxpayers,” arguing that “without whistleblowers, the government simply
does not have the capability to identify and prosecute the ever-expanding
and creative schemes to bilk the taxpayers.”41 Indeed, as more government
money flows through more contracts with more private entities, it is likely
that the FCA will be a robust area of litigation for years to come.42
provisions in the Act remain substantially unchanged. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2012); Doyle,
supra note 26, at 7–8.
35. See generally Government by Contract: Outsourcing and American Democ-
racy (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
36. See id.; Danielle Ivory et al., When You Dial 911 and Wall Street Answers, N.Y. Times:
Dealbook (June 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/business/dealbook/when-
you-dial-911-and-wall-street-answers.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
37. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3
Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmithkline-plead-guilty-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-allega
tions-and-failure-report [https://perma.cc/8KC4-JKKB].
38. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United Technologies Corporation Liable for
over $473 Million for Inflating Prices on Aircraft Engines Sold to Air Force (June 20, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-technologies-corporation-liable-over-473-million-inflat
ing-prices-aircraft-engines [https://perma.cc/398L-5YWW].
39. E.g., Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Morgan Stanley Reaches $1.25 Bil-
lion Mortgage Settlement, N.Y. Times: Dealbook (Feb. 4, 2014, 6:22 PM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/morgan-stanley-reaches-1-25-billion-mortgage-settlement
[https://perma.cc/HZL4-LF67].
40. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014 (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/justice-department-recovers-nearly-6-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014 [https:/
/perma.cc/DB9T-JAAP].
41. Press Release, U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley: False Claims Act Is Our Most
Important Tool to Fight Fraud Against Taxpayers (Apr. 28, 2016), http://
www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/rassley-false-claims-act-our-most-important-
tool-fight-fraud-against-taxpayers [https://perma.cc/JNW8-AYLA].
42. Many states have passed substantially similar statutes that allow individuals to file
suit for fraud perpetrated against state government and agencies. See, e.g., New York False
Claims Act, N.Y. State Fin. Law §§ 187–194 (McKinney 2014); see also States with False
Claims Acts, Taxpayers Against Fraud Educ. Fund, http://www.taf.org/states-false-claims-
acts [https://perma.cc/7QPD-J577]. For the sake of simplicity, this Note does not address spe-
cific provisions of state FCA analogs (except briefly in Part IV), but much of the same analysis
contained elsewhere would apply with equal force to state laws.
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B. The SEC Whistleblower Program
In stark contrast to the trenches of the Civil War, the backdrop of the
birth of the SEC whistleblower program was the infamous financial crash of
2008, whose aftermath revealed widespread high-risk and fraudulent activity
by some of the largest financial institutions in the United States.43 In the
wake of the crash, Congress sought to ensure that the sort of wrongdoing
that contributed to the massive market failure would never happen again.44
In 2010, it passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act,45 which the Obama Administration characterized as “[t]he most
far reaching Wall Street reform in history.”46
Dodd-Frank enacted a sweeping new regime of regulation and oversight
in the financial sector. Among its many reforms, it established a new
whistleblower program to offer incentive awards to those who provide the
SEC with information about violations of securities regulations and created
a new office within the SEC to administer the process.47 Under the SEC
program, individuals with knowledge about securities fraud may submit a
tip to the SEC Office of the Whistleblower. Unlike claims under the FCA,
there are no qui tam provisions that allow the whistleblower to initiate an
action in court directly against the alleged violator. Instead, the SEC investi-
gates tips it receives and determines whether to initiate an enforcement ac-
tion. If information provided by a tipster leads to the SEC bringing an
action that results in monetary sanctions in excess of $1 million,48 then the
whistleblower is entitled to receive an award in the amount of 10% to 30%
of the sanctions imposed.49 As of August 2016, the SEC has received more
than 14,000 tips, awarded over $107 million to thirty-three whistleblowers,
and obtained more than $504 million in sanctions from individuals and
entities committing securities fraud.50
43. See generally Andrew Ross Sorkin, Too Big to Fail (2010); James B. Stewart, Eight
Days: The Battle to Save the American Financial System, New Yorker (Sept. 21, 2009), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/21/eight-days [https://perma.cc/7V4E-BEJM].
44. See, e.g., Alan S. Binder, After the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the
Response, and the Work Ahead (2013); Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the
Doomsday Machine (2011).
45. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
46. Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, White House, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform [https://perma.cc/
7YWD-RARZ].
47. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u–6(a)(1) (2012).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 78u–6(b)(1).
50. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Whistleblower Program Surpasses
$100 Million in Awards (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-173.html
[https://perma.cc/E8ZX-UYHA].
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The Dodd-Frank Act also required the SEC Office of the Inspector Gen-
eral to conduct a study of the whistleblower program and produce a re-
port.51 The report was to address, among other things, “whether . . . it would
be useful for Congress to consider empowering whistleblowers . . . to have a
private right of action to bring suit based on the facts of the same case, on
behalf of the Government and themselves, against persons who have com-
mitte[d] securities fraud.”52 In other words, Congress asked the SEC to con-
sider whether its whistleblower program should look more like the FCA.
In 2013, the Office of the Inspector General released its report detailing
the study’s results.53 The report was skeptical of the qui tam model: it
warned that such a program “could attract unscrupulous bounty hunters”
and might result in “undesirable outcomes such as frivolous litigation, collu-
sion between plaintiffs and defendants, and delays in bringing a suit for the
purpose of increasing the bounty award amount.”54 The program, as it ex-
isted, equipped the SEC with a “gatekeeping mechanism” to protect against
“harmful, profit-seeking [claims] from reaching the judicial system.”55
The SEC ultimately concluded in its report that it was “premature” to
adopt a private right of action because it would be a “[f]undamental
change[ ] in the current approach” that “would disrupt the system that is
currently in place.”56 The Office of the Inspector General proposed gathering
additional data and reconsidering the program’s effectiveness, and then revi-
siting the issue in another two or three years.57 As of 2017, the SEC has yet to
include a private right of action, and the whistleblower program operates in
fundamentally the same manner as it did at its inception.
C. Rule 21F-17
The SEC whistleblower program has antiretaliation provisions that
largely mirror those of the FCA: “No employer may discharge, demote, sus-
pend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner dis-
criminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions of
employment . . . .”58 And a whistleblower who is subject to such discrimina-
tion or discharge has a private right of action in federal court.59 But the SEC
51. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203
§ 922(d)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1848–49 (2010).
52. Id.
53. Office of Audits, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, No. 511, Evaluation of the SEC’s
Whistleblower Program (2013), https://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/511.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BMK7-GC4Q].
54. Id. at 28–29.
55. Id. at 29.
56. Id. at 30.
57. Id.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012).
59. Compare id. § 78u-6(h)(1), with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2012). There is, however, some
disagreement about the criteria that make an individual a “whistleblower” subject to protec-
tion under the statute. See Ed Beeson, Three Little Words: Confusion over Dodd-Frank Is Leaving
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also promulgated Rule 21F-17 in 2011, which provides that “[n]o person
may take any action to impede an individual from communicating directly
with the Commission staff about a possible securities law violation, includ-
ing enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality agreement . . . with
respect to such communications.”60 The SEC implemented Rule 21F-17 be-
cause “efforts to impede an individual’s direct communications with Com-
mission staff about a possible securities law violation would conflict with the
statutory purpose of encouraging individuals to report to the
Commission.”61
The SEC has taken this rule quite seriously and has used it to initiate a
number of enforcement actions. In April 2015, the SEC brought its first
21F-17 action against defense contractor KBR, Inc.62 Like many corpora-
tions, KBR had a practice of performing internal investigations in which it
interviewed company employees to determine compliance with federal se-
curities laws.63 As part of those interviews, KBR required all employees inter-
viewed to sign a confidentiality agreement, which stated, among other
things, that the employee was “prohibited from discussing any particulars
regarding this interview and the subject matter [of] the interview, without
the prior authorization of the [KBR] Law Department.”64 The form agree-
ment further warned that “unauthorized disclosure of information may be
grounds for disciplinary action up to and including termination of
employment.”65
Although the agreement did not include language specifically prohibit-
ing whistleblowing activity, and despite a lack of any evidence that KBR had
ever enforced the confidentiality provision, the SEC nevertheless found that
KBR violated Rule 21F-17.66 The language of the provision, the SEC argued,
had the effect of impeding communication between employees and the SEC
and therefore “undermine[d] the purpose of Section 21F and Rule
21F-17(a), which is to ‘encourag[e] individuals to report to the Commis-
sion.’ ”67 KBR agreed to change the language in its confidentiality agreements
and to reach out to employees who had previously signed such agreements
Whistleblowers Exposed, Law360 (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/838091/con
fusion-over-dodd-frank-is-leaving-whistleblowers-exposed [https://perma.cc/WNL2-BUS7].
60. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17(a) (2017).
61. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,352
(June 13, 2011).
62. See KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74,619, 2015 WL 1456619 (Apr. 1, 2015);
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC: Companies Cannot Stifle Whistleblowers in
Confidentiality Agreements (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-
54.html [https://perma.cc/275X-AJMC].
63. KBR, Inc., 2015 WL 1456619, at *2.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *2–3.
67. Id. at *2 (citations omitted).
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to inform them that the confidentiality provision did not apply to commu-
nications with the SEC.68 The SEC also imposed sanctions on KBR in the
amount of $130,000.69
The decision made waves in the legal community as law firms rushed to
advise their clients to ensure their confidentiality agreements were 21F-17
compliant.70 Lawyers also warned clients of the prospect of similar enforce-
ment actions in the future.71 The SEC, for its part, doubled down on its
position. Andrew J. Ceresney, then director of the SEC’s Division of En-
forcement, announced after the KBR settlement the SEC’s position that
21F-17 could apply beyond confidentiality agreements to reach “employ-
ment, severance, or other types of agreements that may silence potential
whistleblowers”72 and promised that the SEC would continue to “vigorously
enforce this provision.”73
And vigorously enforce the provision it has. Since the KBR action, the
SEC has brought a number of enforcement actions under 21F-17 against
companies using similar provisions in internal investigations, severance
agreements, and other documents.74 Many of the violations involved confi-
dentiality provisions similar to those in the KBR case;75 others required
would-be whistleblowers to disclaim a future interest in any SEC award.76 In
each case, the defendant corporation settled with the SEC without challeng-
ing the legitimacy of its application of the rule.77
These enforcement practices have not been without their critics. Some
in the legal community have characterized the SEC’s enforcement of Rule
68. Id. at *2–3.
69. Id. at *3–4.
70. See, e.g., Gibson Dunn, SEC Brings First Enforcement Action Challenging
Employee Confidentiality Agreement Alleged to Impede Whistleblowers (2015),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/SEC—First-Enforcement-Action-Chal
lenging-Employee-Confidentiality-Agreement-Alleged-to-Impede-Whistleblowers.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VL5Z-F5WE]; Shearman & Sterling LLP, SEC Says Confidentiality Agree-
ments May Impede Whistleblowers (2015), http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/
NewsInsights/Publications/2015/04/SEC-Says-Confidentiality-Agreements-May-Impede-Whis
tleblowers-LIT-04022015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9HQ-PVHA].
71. See, e.g., Aaron Katz & Alexandra Roth, SEC Imposes Fine on KBR for Violating Dodd-
Frank Whistleblower Protection, Ropes & Gray (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.ropesgray.com/
newsroom/alerts/2015/April/SEC-Imposes-Fine-on-KBR-for-Violating-Dodd-Frank-Whistle
blower-Protection-Rule.aspx [https://perma.cc/H6N2-65BB]; William R. McLucas et al., SEC
Applies Whistleblower Interference Rule to Corporate Confidentiality Requirement, WilmerHale
(Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.
aspx?NewsPubId=17179877088 [https://perma.cc/5MFU-JNVW].
72. KBR, Inc., 2015 WL 1456619, at *2.
73. Id.
74. E.g., BlueLinx Holdings, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-78528, 2016 WL 4363864
(Aug. 10, 2016).
75. E.g., id.
76. E.g., Health Net, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-78590, 2016 WL 4474755 (Aug.
16, 2016).
77. See id.; BlueLinx, 2016 WL 4363864.
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21F-17 as “aggressive and far-reaching,” asserting that it is “far from clear
that the Commission’s position would ultimately be upheld if tested in a
litigated case.”78 But the SEC has shown no intention of slowing down. In
October 2016, the SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations
issued a “risk alert” that discussed its 21F-17 enforcement activity and af-
firmed its intent to continue to prosecute violations.79 The risk alert en-
couraged entities to “evaluate whether their compliance manuals, codes of
ethics, employment agreements, severance agreements, and other docu-
ments contain language that may be inconsistent with Rule 21F-17.”80
II. Protecting Whistleblowers: Retaliation Under the False
Claims Act
The FCA antiretaliation provisions—discussed briefly above81—allow a
whistleblower to seek relief in federal court if she is retaliated against be-
cause of her whistleblowing activity.82 Whistleblowers are protected if they
take some step to investigate wrongdoing that is actionable under the FCA,
even if they ultimately do not file a lawsuit.83 By including antiretaliation
provisions in the Act, Congress has provided protection for whistleblowers
who suffer adverse consequences after coming forward with knowledge of
wrongdoing. These provisions are oriented toward protecting the person
rather than the claim; they focus on the whistleblower rather than the
whistleblowing. This Part examines the consequences and limitations of that
78. Gibson Dunn, supra note 70, at 2.
79. Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
National Exam Program Risk Alert: Examining Whistleblower Rule Compliance
(2016), https://www.sec.gov/ocie/announcement/ocie-2016-risk-alert-examining-whistleblow
er-rule-compliance.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4H5-WYWQ].
80. Id. at 3. Other agencies have begun to follow suit. In November 2016, the director of
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy for the Department of Defense announced a new
prohibition that prevents federal dollars from going to any contractor that “requires employees
or contractors of such entity seeking to report fraud . . . waste, or . . . abuse to sign internal
confidentiality agreements or statements prohibiting or otherwise restricting such employees
or contractors from lawfully reporting such waste, fraud, or abuse.” Memorandum from
Claire M. Grady, Dir., Def. Procurement & Acquisition Policy, Office of the Under Sec’y of
Def., to Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command et al. 1 (Nov. 14, 2016), http://
www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA004514-16-DPAP.pdf [https://perma.cc/BNL7-
DJG4]. The Department of Defense, along with the General Services Administration and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, have also proposed codifying a similar rule in
the Federal Acquisition Regulations. Federal Acquisition Regulation: Contractor Employee In-
ternal Confidentiality Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 3763 (Jan. 22, 2016) (to be codified at 48
C.F.R. pts. 3, 4, 52). The rule would require each contractor to certify that it does not use
restrictive confidentiality agreements, to modify existing contracts to comply with the new
rule, and to notify employees subject to preexisting agreements that those clauses are no longer
effective. Id.
81. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
82. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1) (2012).
83. See United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 739–40 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (“[T]he protected conduct . . . of such a [retaliation] claim does not require the plaintiff
to have developed a winning qui tam action before he is retaliated against.”).
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decision. There is a critical need to protect whistleblowers from discrimina-
tion. But focusing solely on whistleblower protection leaves room for some
wrongdoers to undermine the effectiveness of the FCA.
A. The Need to Protect Whistleblowers
To be sure, there are legitimate and compelling reasons for the govern-
ment to protect whistleblowers from personal and professional retaliation.
There is a long and sordid history of individuals who have been targeted and
persecuted for their whistleblowing activity.84 Even when a whistleblower
does not experience professional repercussions for her actions, the experi-
ence of reporting an employer is often a stressful and grueling one that can
produce a range of adverse effects on the physical and mental health of the
whistleblower and her family.85 Individuals who have legitimate knowledge
of fraudulent activity may hesitate to come forward with that activity if they
fear personal or professional blowback from “snitching,” and data suggests
that, despite legislative protections, retaliation remains a real concern for
many employees. A 2011 survey by the Ethics Resource Center found that
22% of American workers who reported misconduct actually experienced
retaliation.86 The survey identified fear of retaliation as “[o]ne of the most
common reasons that employees choose not to report misconduct”87 and
84. This Note focuses on whistleblowing in the United States. For an example of retalia-
tion against whistleblowers abroad, see Karthik Balasubramanian, Ten Years After IIT Engineer
Was Murdered for Exposing Corruption, Indian Bill Still Doesn’t Protect Whistleblowers,
Scroll.in (Feb. 7, 2014), https://scroll.in/article/655790/ten-years-after-iit-engineer-was-mur-
dered-for-exposing-corruption-indian-bill-still-doesnt-protect-whistleblowers [https://
perma.cc/QS6W-UX6R]. One prominent example of a whistleblower experiencing retaliation
in the United States is Jeffrey Wigand, the former director of research for Brown & William-
son, then the third largest tobacco manufacturer in the world. Cassi Feldman, 60 Minutes’
Most Famous Whistleblower, 60 Minutes (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-
minutes-most-famous-whistleblower/ [https://perma.cc/QBB4-WB7Q]. Wigand claimed
Brown & Williamson terminated him after he got into a dispute with management about the
company’s knowledge of nicotine’s addictive qualities. Id. Wigand ultimately decided to go
public with the information despite the objections of his employer. Id. After coming forward,
Wigand reported that he and his family received a number of death threats and that his former
employer engaged in a large-scale smear campaign against him. Marie Brenner, The Man Who
Knew Too Much, Vanity Fair (May 1996), http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/1996/05/
wigand199605 [https://perma.cc/U5R4-LXYP]. In another case, a Halliburton employee
named Tony Menendez reported to the SEC claims that his employer had committed a variety
of accounting violations. Jesse Eisinger, The Whistleblower’s Tale: How an Accountant Took on
Halliburton, ProPublica (Apr. 21, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/the-
whistleblowers-tale-how-an-accountant-took-on-halliburton [https://perma.cc/RX49-G7KF].
Once Halliburton learned that Menendez was the source of the allegations, Menendez exper-
ienced repercussions at work, including being excluded from meetings, losing job responsibili-
ties, and being outcast by his colleagues. Id.
85. K. Jean Lennane, “Whistleblowing”: A Health Issue, 307 Brit. Med. J. 667, 667–69
(1993).
86. Ethics Res. Ctr., Retaliation: When Whistleblowers Become Victims 3
(2012), http://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/03_Topic-Areas/06-Retaliation/20150410/06_ERC_Re
taliationWhenWhistleblowersBecomeVictims.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4CK-P6WZ].
87. Id. at 5.
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noted that among employees who were aware of misconduct but chose not
to report it, 46% cited fear of retaliation as the reason for their failure to
report.88 Indeed, in passing the 1986 amendments to the FCA, which in-
cluded the antiretaliation provisions, Congress recognized that “few individ-
uals will expose fraud if they fear their disclosures will lead to harassment,
demotion, loss of employment, or any other form of retaliation.”89 By enact-
ing the antiretaliation provisions of the FCA and subjecting employers to
liability for retaliation, Congress hoped to blunt the fear of retaliation and
thus pave the way for more individuals to come forward.
B. The Goals of Antiretaliation Legislation
Protecting whistleblowers from retaliation is in the public interest. But
the act of whistleblowing involves a complex web of relationships between
the individual whistleblower, the employer, the government, and the pub-
lic—all of whom may have competing or overlapping interests.
Whistleblower law necessarily involves navigating and regulating those rela-
tionships, and balancing the interests involved. This Section focuses on the
public interest rationales underlying any whistleblower law regime.
Generally speaking, there are two separate, but overlapping, interests
that animate most whistleblower law: an antifraud interest in encouraging
future whistleblowing and an antiretaliation interest in protecting
whistleblowers.90 The first interest—the antifraud interest—is concerned
with bringing fraudulent activity to light and stopping its perpetrators from
committing further wrongs. Reporting fraud benefits the public good be-
cause it stops and deters wrongdoing. This, in turn, recoups wasted taxpayer
money and prevents future waste and, in some cases, may address a threat to
public health or safety.91 By prohibiting retaliation, legislators send a mes-
sage to future whistleblowers that they should feel safe to report fraud (fur-
thering the antifraud interest) without fear of repercussion.92 Less fraud is a
good thing, and whistleblower-protection laws seek to minimize fraudulent
activity by paving the way for whistleblowers to come forward.
88. Id. at 5 & n.4.
89. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 34 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.A.N. 5266, 5300.
90. Cf. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection: A Tale of
Reform Versus Power, 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 183, 189 (2007) (highlighting two key “considera-
tions” for whistleblowers: will their whistleblowing “fix the problem” and will the
whistleblower “be protected from a destroyed career, financial ruin, and, perhaps, physical
threat”).
91. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 37 (announcing the False Claims
Act settlement involving sale of misbranded drugs in interstate commerce and failure to report
drug-safety data to FDA).
92. But see Gov’t Accountability Project, Why Whistleblowers Wait: Recom-
mendations to Improve the Dodd-Frank Law’s SEC Whistleblower Awards Program
12 (2016) https://www.whistleblower.org/sites/default/files/GAP_Report_Why_Whistleblowers
_Wait.pdf [https://perma.cc/UM98-PMQS] (“Fear of reprisal is a very realistic and very dan-
gerous source of complaint inhibition that cannot be eliminated totally by [antiretaliation]
provisions.”).
490 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:475
The second interest—the antiretaliation interest—focuses on protecting
whistleblowers from enduring the hardships that can result from reporting
wrongdoing. This interest relates to the antifraud interest in an obvious way:
if a putative whistleblower knows that she is protected from retaliation, she
will be more likely to report fraud. But there is more in play here than
encouraging speculative future third-party conduct. In addition to promot-
ing the reporting of fraud, there is also a public interest in simply ensuring
that a present whistleblower is not punished for her whistleblowing. This
assurance is not to incentivize or reward whistleblowing; rather, it is to
merely prevent the normative wrong that occurs when a whistleblower suf-
fers personal or professional harm for serving the public good.
The qui tam mechanism of the FCA recognizes this interest, at least
implicitly. In enabling payment of an award to a whistleblower, the statute
seeks in part to compensate that person for potential negative externalities
she bears in the pursuit of her claim—a claim that principally benefits the
government, which bears none of the costs but stands to reap the rewards in
the event of a successful litigation. In determining the amount of the award
a whistleblower should receive under the FCA, one factor that the Depart-
ment of Justice considers is whether “[t]he filing of the complaint had a
substantial adverse impact on the relator.”93 If the whistleblower suffered an
adverse impact, the DOJ guidelines recommend an increased award.94 As
Justice Kennedy has explained, the qui tam mechanism “is designed to bene-
fit both the relator and the Government.”95
The interests of an employer who is committing fraud and an employee
who knows about it are fundamentally adverse to one another. The em-
ployer has an interest in not having its fraudulent activity revealed and in
not being a defendant in a lawsuit. Conversely, the employee has an interest
in revealing the fraud (to the extent that combatting fraud benefits the pub-
lic) and in pursuing the portion of the award to which she is entitled as a
whistleblower. But she also has a significant personal interest in keeping her
job and avoiding repercussions relating to her whistleblowing activity.96 In
these situations, antiretaliation provisions are effective because they prevent
employers from undertaking adverse employment actions against
whistleblowers, which would undermine the qui tam incentive structure that
Congress implemented in the Act. Indeed, Congress intended the antiretalia-
tion provisions to “halt companies and individuals from using the threat of
economic retaliation to silence ‘whistleblowers,’ as well as assure those who
may be considering exposing fraud that they are legally protected from retal-
iatory acts.”97
93. DOJ Relator’s Share Guidelines, 11 False Claims Act & Qui Tam Q. Rev. 17, 18
(1997).
94. Id. at 17–18.
95. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. 436, 440 (2016).
96. See Ramirez, supra note 90, at 189–90.
97. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 34 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.A.N. 5266, 5300.
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But antiretaliation provisions do little good when the employer’s action
is not necessarily adverse to the interests of the employee, but rather is neu-
tral—or even beneficial (for example, a severance agreement with a gener-
ous payout). In those cases, the interests of the employer and employee are
not so divergent, and the likelihood that the employee will blow the whistle
on the employer’s wrongdoing is limited. There are two types of nonadverse
employer activities that are of primary concern: activity that chills
whistleblowing by discouraging employees from serving as whistleblowers
(“chilling activity”), and activity that procedurally restricts the legal ability
of an employee to actually bring a whistleblowing claim (“restrictive activ-
ity”). Both types of activity threaten to deter legitimate FCA litigation but do
not necessarily run afoul of the existing antiretaliation provisions in the Act.
1. Chilling Activity
An employer engages in chilling activity when it takes some nonadverse
action that has the probable effect (whether or not intended) of discourag-
ing employees from pursuing legitimate whistleblower claims. The restrictive
confidentiality clauses discussed above provide a useful example of this
principle.
Consider a confidentiality clause similar to the one used by KBR that
was the subject of an SEC enforcement action.98 The mere presence of the
confidentiality clause may well discourage individual employees from com-
ing forward for a number of reasons: employees may fear they will suffer
employment repercussions if they violate the agreement, or they may be
uncertain that reporting fraud to the government is even legally permitted.
The latter concern is not legally justified. Courts have generally held that
these sorts of clauses are without legal teeth—whistleblowers are permitted
to provide the government with confidential information in the course of an
FCA action or rely on such information as the basis of their complaint.99 But
the problem with these clauses is about their bark, not their bite. The issue is
not whether courts will enforce such an agreement if it is challenged in
court. Rather, the issue is whether cases will never make it to court in the
first place because the mere existence of the provision deters whistleblowers
from reporting fraud. An employee who suspects her employer of engaging
in illegal conduct may well hesitate to approach an attorney or government
official out of fear that disclosing confidential information will result in re-
taliation by her employer—a well-founded fear given the language of many
such agreements.100
98. See supra notes 62–72 and accompanying text.
99. E.g., United States ex rel. Cieszynski v. Lifewatch Servs., Inc., No. 13 CV 4052, 2016
WL 2771798 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2016). For a more in-depth discussion of counterclaims against
plaintiff-relators, see Walsh v. Amerisource Bergen Corp., No. 11-7584, 2014 WL 2738215 (E.D.
Pa. June 17, 2014).
100. The regulatory history of Rule 21F-17 reveals that the SEC was concerned about
precisely this:
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Employers wield an inherent authority over their employees, and the
mere implication that certain conduct is prohibited (or even just frowned
upon) can have real effects. Data suggests that the SEC’s concern is not sheer
speculation. Recall the statistics discussed above: 46% of employees declined
to report misconduct out of fear of retaliation, while 22% of those who
reported such misconduct claimed to have experienced retaliatory acts.101
Fear of retaliation chills whistleblowing activity, even when retaliation does
not actually occur.102
Yet it may be quite difficult to prove that a clause like the one used by
KBR ran afoul of the FCA’s antiretaliation provisions—that is, that the
clause “discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any
other manner discriminated against” an employee.103 The case becomes even
more difficult if the clause is never actually enforced. And indeed, there is
reason to believe that the attorneys who draft these clauses are aware of this
chilling effect: attorneys have advocated for employers to use general releases
in severance agreements regardless of their enforceability because, “[a]t the
least, a well-drafted pre-filing release of qui tam claims may cause an em-
ployee to hesitate before bringing a qui tam action against his or her former
employer.”104 That is, the mere inclusion of such a clause may have the in-
tended effect of discouraging whistleblower claims. Where the SEC has been
able to target this sort of activity through Rule 21F-17, the antiretaliation
provisions of the FCA come up short.
2. Restrictive Activity
Restrictive activity is employer activity that actually impairs the proce-
dural ability of employees who might otherwise be inclined to file FCA law-
suits. Legal scholars have described a recent trend of judicial hostility
towards certain kinds of individual actions—including skepticism of class-
action litigation105 and increased enforcement of waivers and arbitration
[A]n attempt to enforce a confidentiality agreement against an individual to prevent his
or her communications with Commission staff about a possible securities law violation
could inhibit those communications even when such an agreement would be legally un-
enforceable, and would undermine the effectiveness of the countervailing incentives that
Congress established to encourage individuals to disclose possible violations to the
Commission.
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,352 (proposed
June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) (footnote omitted).
101. Ethics Res. Ctr., supra note 86, at 3, 5 n.4.
102. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 62 (“[A]ny company’s blan-
ket prohibition against witnesses discussing the substance of the interview has a potential
chilling effect on whistleblowers’ willingness to report illegal conduct to the SEC.”).
103. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2012).
104. Todd P. Photopulos & Graham W. Askew, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too—The
(Un)Enforceability of Releases on Future Qui Tam Claims, J. Health & Life Sci. L., July 2008,
at 145, 161.
105. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
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clauses106—resulting in a diminished ability for individuals to pursue claims
in court.107 In the context of the FCA, this trend implicates unique concerns
because of the public interest affected and the distinctive function of the qui
tam mechanism.
An example of restrictive activity is the employee severance agreement,
which often contains a broad, general release of all claims the employee
might have against the employer.108 When an employee has signed such a
waiver, employers may claim that the employee has waived her right to pro-
ceed as a plaintiff-relator in a qui tam action against the employer. Courts
have struggled to resolve this issue and have yet to reach a clear consensus.
In United States ex rel. Green v. Northrop Corp.,109 Michael Green brought an
FCA lawsuit against his employer, Northrop, after learning that it had
“double charged” the United States for certain equipment purchased by the
Air Force for its B-2 bomber program.110 Before Green filed suit, Northrop
terminated his employment.111 Pursuant to his severance agreement, Green
received $190,000 in severance pay and, in exchange, signed an extremely
broad agreement that included a clause in which he purportedly agreed to
“release, acquit and forever discharge Northrop . . . from any and all claims
. . . and causes of action of every nature, under any theory under the law . . .
whether known or unknown.”112
The Ninth Circuit considered the text and legislative history of the stat-
ute, and after determining that Congress had not expressed intent one way
or the other about whether such a waiver should be enforced,113 applied
federal common law to determine that the waiver was unenforceable.114 The
court noted that “qui tam actions exist only to vindicate the public inter-
est”115 and that courts should not enforce a release that was entered into
106. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mo-
bility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
107. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 90 Denv. U. L. Rev. 317
(2012); Jed S. Rakoff, Why You Won’t Get Your Day in Court, N.Y. Rev. Books (Nov. 24, 2016),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/11/24/why-you-wont-get-your-day-in-court/ [https://
perma.cc/5347-FCXE].
108. See, e.g., Susan Adams, The Top Ten Reasons to Hire a Lawyer to Review Your Sever-
ance Agreement, Forbes (Dec. 1, 2011, 10:57 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/
2011/12/01/the-top-ten-reasons-to-hire-a-lawyer-to-review-your-severance-agreement/#2a705
f9a419b [https://perma.cc/B2G8-RPGS]; Severance Pay: Release of Legal Claims, Legal Aid
Work, https://las-elc.org/fact-sheets/severance-pay-release-legal-claims [https://perma.cc/
3P2Y-V42R] (noting that an employer may make severance pay contingent upon employee
signing “[a] release of claims,” which is “generally legal and enforceable”).
109. 59 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 1995).
110. Green, 59 F.3d at 956.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 960 (“[W]e have no basis for inferring that Congress intended the release at
issue to be enforceable or unenforceable. . . . Therefore, we are faced with a ‘gap’ in the
statutory scheme.”).
114. Id. at 963–68.
115. Id. at 968.
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before the filing of a complaint and without the knowledge or consent of the
United States.116 Enforcing such an agreement, the court reasoned, would
“dilute significantly the incentives that Congress” had built into the FCA
because a would-be whistleblower would be left with “no right or reason to
file a qui tam claim.”117
The Ninth Circuit reached a different outcome in a later case where the
plaintiff-relator executed the agreement after filing his FCA action, and after
the government had already started to investigate the claim.118 Because the
government was already aware of the fraud allegations at the time the em-
ployee entered into the agreement, the court enforced the waiver.119 It found
enforcement was appropriate because “the public interest in having infor-
mation brought forward that the government could not otherwise obtain
[was] not implicated.”120 The Fourth121 and Tenth122 Circuits have also
looked to “government knowledge” to decide whether a claim is enforceable,
holding that “when . . . the government was aware, prior to the filing of the
qui tam action, of the fraudulent conduct represented by the relator’s allega-
tions, the public interest has been served and the Release should be
enforced.”123
The “government knowledge” solution is rather unsatisfying. Congress
elected to use the qui tam mechanism—which gives the whistleblower a fair
degree of autonomy over the litigation—instead of a model more like the
administrative whistleblower programs, which delegate total control to the
agency over the decision of which claims to pursue. The fact that the FCA
specifically allows plaintiff-relators to pursue a case even where the govern-
ment has declined to intervene124 suggests that Congress recognized the im-
portance of allowing private enforcement to proceed even where the
government might, for whatever reason, be disinclined to pursue the
claim.125 Congress did not specify exactly why the government may decline
to intervene in a meritorious case, but there are several plausible reasons,
including finite government resources, conflicting interests, and expertise
116. Id. at 965.
117. Id.
118. United States ex rel. Hall v. Teledyne Wah Chang Albany, 104 F.3d 230 (9th Cir.
1997).
119. Id. at 233.
120. Id.
121. United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 600 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2010).
122. United States ex rel. Ritchie v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 558 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir.
2009).
123. Radcliffe, 600 F.3d at 332–33 (noting concurrence with the Tenth Circuit).
124. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2012) (“If the Government elects not to proceed with the
action, the person who initiated the action shall have the right to conduct the action.”).
125. Between 1987 and 2005, the Department of Justice intervened in approximately 27%
of filed False Claims Act cases. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-06-320R, Information
on False Claims Act Litigation 29 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06320r.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6WE4-ZLAE].
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that a whistleblower may have that a government lawyer may lack.126
Whatever the precise reasoning, it is clear that Congress intended to permit
more qui tam litigation, not less, and it intentionally decided to not have the
Department of Justice serve as a gatekeeper, determining which cases would
proceed and which should be dismissed. In this way, private qui tam en-
forcement is able to “push[ ] into regulatory gaps left by legislative and ad-
ministrative inertia”127 and areas “where political and democratic control
may be less dependable.”128 By looking to whether the government has al-
ready learned of the fraud allegations (and thus could potentially enforce
against them), courts diminish the discretion the FCA bestows upon private
citizens engaging in public enforcement. The risk, in turn, is a resulting de-
crease in whistleblowing activity.
In recent years, some courts have shown a willingness to honor arbitra-
tion agreements that force qui tam litigation into an arbitral forum instead
of federal court.129 These forums are often defendant friendly and may in-
clude a cap on damages, selection of one or more arbitrators by the defen-
dant, and other features that can make the case exceedingly difficult for
plaintiff-relators.130 These arbitration agreements, then, also impose a poten-
tially stifling effect on qui tam litigation by relocating the forum from the
one designated by Congress to one where the claim may face diminished
chances of success.131
Courts are not likely to consider chilling and restrictive activity as be-
havior that “discriminates” against the employee to be discrimination as
contemplated by the FCA’s antiretaliation provisions. In most cases, the ef-
fect on the employee is either neutral (as in the case of an unenforced confi-
dentiality clause) or even beneficial (as in the case of an employee who
receives a severance package that offers a significant payment of money in
exchange for the signing of a general release). But practices that chill or stifle
whistleblowing are undesirable because they undercut the strong public in-
terest in combatting fraud. When employers engage in these practices, they
126. See William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Gov-
ernment Contracting, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1799, 1823–24 (1996) (noting that the qui tam
structure allows individuals to “second-guess internal government decisions not to prosecute
where such decisions may be the result of capture or corruption”).
127. David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons From Qui Tam
Litigation, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1913, 1923 (2014).
128. Id. at 1968–91.
129. E.g., United States ex rel. Hicks v. Evercare Hosp., No. 1:12-cv-887, 2015 WL 4498744
(S.D. Ohio July 23, 2015); Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. Coll. Co., No. 3:12-cv-63, 2013 WL
394875 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2013).
130. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the
Deck of Justice, N.Y. Times (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/
dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html (on file with the Michigan
Law Review).
131. See Mathew Andrews, Whistling in the Silence: The Implications of Arbitration on Qui
Tam Cases Under the False Claims Act, 15 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 203, 251–66 (2015) (discuss-
ing concerns that qui tam arbitration could “blunt the effectiveness of the FCA and tip the
scales in defendants’ favor”).
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realign the interests of the wrongdoer and the would-be whistleblower, to
the detriment of the government and the public.
This sort of activity contravenes the history and purpose of the FCA and
undermines the robust fraud-fighting mechanism Congress created. It also
circumvents the incentive structure Congress intentionally crafted through
its implementation of the qui tam procedure. Where the FCA—including its
antiretaliation provisions—is designed to give employees incentives to come
forward and blow the whistle, chilling and restrictive employer activity
threatens to take those incentives away. And the existing antiretaliation pro-
visions are unable to reach this activity. Current FCA measures target ac-
tions that punish whistleblowers for making a claim, rather than actions that
discourage whistleblowers from bringing claims in the first place.
III. Protecting Whistleblowing: Rule 21F-17 as a
Model for Reform
Although courts and legislatures have primarily focused on laws protect-
ing individual whistleblowers, it is time for a shift in the way that we think
about whistleblower-retaliation law. Whether working within a statutory qui
tam regime like the FCA, or a modern administrative program like the SEC
Office of the Whistleblower, courts and lawmakers should expand and reori-
ent their focus to ensure that these laws protect not only whistleblowers but
also whistleblowing. Doing so will afford more robust protection of fraud-
fighting activity, while honoring the purpose and intent that undergird these
programs. This reform could come about in several ways.
First, courts can and should recognize the importance of deterring an-
tiwhistleblowing activity: such conduct runs counter to the purpose of the
FCA and frustrates congressional intent.132 When courts review documents
like severance or arbitration agreements, which purport to restrict the ability
of an employee to bring a whistleblowing claim, courts should refuse to
enforce their terms as against public policy.133 The antifraud policy underly-
ing whistleblower law provides support for such a finding. Where an em-
ployer committing fraud is able to manufacture procedural impediments to
the prosecution of a whistleblower claim, those agreements undermine con-
gressional intent and should not be enforced.
The power of the courts, however, is necessarily limited. By its terms,
the FCA only focuses on preventing reactive retaliation. The FCA does not
empower courts to reach forward-looking activity designed to chill or re-
strict future whistleblowing. When a company uses a confidentiality clause
132. See, e.g., Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 2005) (ex-
plaining that the purpose of qui tam provision is to “encourage whistleblowers to act as private
attorneys-general in bringing suits for the common good”).
133. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) (noting that
courts may refuse to enforce unconscionable contracts); see also Winston v. Academi Training
Ctr., Inc., No. 1:12-cv-767, 2013 WL 989999 (E.D. Va. Mar. 13, 2013) (holding agreement to
arbitrate FCA complaint procedurally unconscionable and invalid).
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that discourages whistleblowing, for example, courts will generally not en-
force it.134 The damage, however, is already done since the entire point of
chilling activity is that the claims do not reach courts in the first instance.
Because the FCA is currently silent about proactive antiwhistleblowing activ-
ity, courts are simply not equipped to address this sort of behavior.
Rule 21F-17 offers a model for how Congress could bolster protection of
the FCA through legislation that counters not only harm targeted toward
whistleblowers, but also harm to whistleblowing activity. Congress could
implement a provision like Rule 21F-17 and create a new cause of action
under the FCA establishing liability for employers that engage in an-
tiwhistleblowing conduct. The cause of action could authorize the attorney
general and the Department of Justice to enforce violations, rather than pri-
vate individuals. Entrusting the Department of Justice rather than individu-
als to prosecute these violations has logical appeal since, unlike retaliation
actions, the injury inflicted by antiwhistleblowing activity is closer to a pub-
lic harm—it injures the government and the public by discouraging
whistleblowing activity while its harm to any particular employee is more
speculative.135
Such a provision would serve the public interest in prosecuting
whistleblowing claims and also preserve the congressional intent underlying
the FCA. Congress implemented the qui tam model to create a specific in-
centive structure: “setting a rogue to catch a rogue” by inducing those with
knowledge of fraud to come forward through the promise of a bounty.136
Congress implemented an incentive structure that better aligned the inter-
ests of the whistleblower with those of the government and the public,
thereby encouraging whistleblowing claims. When the very employers en-
gaging in fraud can realign those incentive structures—through, for exam-
ple, lucrative severance packages that incorporate general releases or
confidentiality clauses that confuse employees about their rights—the pur-
pose of the statute is frustrated.
To be sure, enabling the Department of Justice to prosecute companies
that engage in proactive antiwhistleblowing activity could enable a wide
swath of enforcement activity.137 But that administrative cost is worth the
benefit to the weighty public interests at play. By enacting a whistleblowing-
protecting provision, Congress would ensure that that the private citizens it
authorizes to pursue claims of fraud on its behalf would be free to do so
untainted by external interference or influence. And although Rule 21F-17
enables the SEC to prosecute these violations, many of the largest FCA viola-
tions have come from entities and industries where the relevant conduct is
134. See supra note 99.
135. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Inju-
ries,” and Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163 (1992).
136. See supra text accompanying note 20.
137. The United States government routinely awards over $500 billion in contracts each
year. See Overview of Awards by Fiscal Year, USASpending, https://www.usaspending.gov/
transparency/Pages/OverviewOfAwards.aspx [https://perma.cc/D4K7-5PZM].
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not within the ambit of SEC regulation and is thus beyond the reach of the
SEC program and its rules.138 Additionally, with the future of the Dodd-
Frank Act and the SEC whistleblower program uncertain,139 adding an inde-
pendent basis for whistleblowing protection within the FCA would ensure
that employers would continue to be accountable for antiwhistleblowing
activity.
Apart from Congress, antiwhistleblowing behavior could be proscribed
at the state level. Many states have passed statutes analogous to the FCA—
including qui tam provisions—that enable lawsuits against individuals or
entities that have submitted false claims for payment to a state govern-
ment.140 Legislation that reins in antiwhistleblowing activity would promote
state interests for the same reasons that federal legislation would bolster sim-
ilar federal interests implicated under the FCA. Moreover, if such protection
gained traction in enough states—or in states with large enough popula-
tions—companies that operate across the country may implement the more
restrictive policies nationwide to ensure compliance and uniformity.141
Certainly, there would be pushback to this sort of legislation. Corpora-
tions that use waivers, arbitration agreements, restrictive confidentiality
clauses, and the like will object to new limitations on their efforts to avoid
liability for these claims. But it is hardly a novel idea that public interest
138. Many of the top FCA settlements, for example, have involved off-label marketing of
prescription medication. See Top 100 FCA Cases, Taxpayers Against Fraud Educ. Fund,
http://www.taf.org/general-resources/top-100-fca-cases [https://perma.cc/5NPY-AVC2].
139. There is some uncertainty about what SEC whistleblower enforcement will look like
going forward. Following the election of Donald Trump, SEC is under new leadership. See
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Chair Mary Jo White Announces Departure
Plans (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-238.html [https://
perma.cc/EM2W-W78S]; Leslie Picker, Donald Trump Nominates Wall Street Lawyer to Head
S.E.C., N.Y. Times (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/business/dealbook/
donald-trump-sec-jay-clayton.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). President Trump
has called the Dodd-Frank Act a “disaster” and promised to “do a big number” on it—pre-
sumably not one that will expand its regulatory reach. Matt Egan, Trump Pledges to “Do a Big
Number” on Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform, CNNMoney (Jan. 30, 2017, 4:53 PM), http://
money.cnn.com/2017/01/30/investing/dodd-frank-trump-regulation-banks/ [https://perma.cc/
WJ98-MAG3] (calling the Act a “disaster”). While experts speculate that any change to the
Dodd-Frank Act would not result in the wholesale dismantling of the SEC whistleblower pro-
gram, its future is unclear. See Carmen Germaine, Big SEC Whistleblower Bounties Won’t
Change with Trump, Law360 (Nov. 14, 2016, 9:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
862235/big-sec-whistleblower-bounties-won-t-change-with-trump [https://perma.cc/2QP3-
ANST]; Samuel Rubenfeld, Dodd-Frank Rollback to Spare SEC Whistleblower Program, Experts
Say, Wall Street J. (Nov. 15, 2016, 6:38 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2016/
11/15/dodd-frank-rollback-to-spare-sec-whistleblower-program-experts-say/ (on file with the
Michigan Law Review).
140. See, e.g., New York False Claims Act, N.Y. State Fin. Law §§ 187–194 (McKinney
2014); see also States with False Claims Acts, supra note 42.
141. See, e.g., Steven Overly, Even in Trump’s America, California Could Decide How
Cleanly Your Car Runs, Wash. Post (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
innovations/wp/2017/02/23/even-in-trumps-america-california-could-decide-how-clean-your-
car-runs [https://perma.cc/6KUC-WJAW] (noting the “magnifying power” of California
regulations).
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considerations may justify restricting employee-employer communications.
Many states, for example, limit the duration of noncompete clauses in em-
ployment or severance agreements on public interest grounds.142 State and
federal regulations require employers to make certain disclosures to their
employees.143 And government agencies have promulgated rules prohibiting
arbitration agreements in certain contexts.144 Here, the compelling public
interest in protecting whistleblowing claims overwhelms the relatively minor
obligations that the proposed provision would impose.145 The public interest
in identifying and stopping fraud, waste, and abuse is well recognized. Ad-
ding this provision would simply sharpen the FCA as the “most effective
civil tool”146 to prevent fraud and protect government programs.
Conclusion
The FCA continues to be a critical mechanism for the government to
identify and combat fraud. While current antiretaliation protocols serve the
important function of protecting those who come forward to report wrong-
doing, they ultimately come up short. Current law does little to prevent em-
ployers from engaging in chilling or restrictive activity that may have a
detrimental effect on the robust antifraud regime Congress intended to cre-
ate. Judges and lawmakers should reorient their understanding of an-
tiretaliation to prohibit not only behavior that affects the individual
whistleblower after the fact, but also preemptive behavior that deters
whistleblowing before it can occur. Administrative whistleblowing programs
like the SEC Office of the Whistleblower, and in particular SEC Rule 21F-17,
provide a useful model. Focusing on protecting both whistleblowers and
whistleblowing would vindicate the original intent and purpose of the FCA
and encourage whistleblowers to come forward and put an end to corporate
wrongdoing. Protecting whistleblowing benefits the government, taxpayers,
142. E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Serv. § 445.774a (LexisNexis 2013) (“An employer may
obtain from an employee an agreement or covenant which protects an employer’s reasonable
competitive business interests and expressly prohibits an employee from engaging in employ-
ment or a line of business after termination of employment if the agreement or covenant is
reasonable as to its duration, geographical area, and the type of employment or line of
business.”).
143. E.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 3550 (West 2011) (requiring employers to post in “conspicu-
ous location frequented by employees” notice identifying insurance carrier responsible for
compensation insurance and claims adjustment); 29 C.F.R. § 825.300 (2016) (requiring every
employer covered by FMLA to post “in a conspicuous place where employees are employed”
notice explaining provisions of FMLA and procedures for filing complaints under FMLA).
144. E.g., 81 Fed. Reg. 68,688, 68,867 (Oct. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 483)
(prohibiting arbitration clauses in certain nursing home contracts). But see Am. Health Care
Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 3:16-CV-00233, 2016 WL 658295 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 7, 2016) (enjoining
enforcement of this rule).
145. See generally Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the
First Amendment, 101 Minn. L. Rev. 31 (2016).
146. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 3 (quoting Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Benjamin C. Mizer).
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and whistleblowers—and ensures that the FCA remains an effective instru-
ment in the fight against fraud.
